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PRELUDE TO VEXATION 
What is a homeland security future worth creating?1 Each of us could posit an 
answer to that question. After enough talk, we would probably agree on the broad 
outlines of a desirable future. Eventually we could develop a strategy for 
implementing that vision – or at least some of it – within the next ten years.  But 
as the years passed, our vision would encounter the tedium of incrementalism, 
the discontinuity of unexpected disappointment, and the surprise of unearned 
fortune.   
Nietzsche wrote about this process:  
To make plans and project designs brings with it many good sensations; 
and whoever had the strength to be nothing but a forger of plans his 
whole life long would be a very happy man. But he would occasionally 
have to take a rest from this activity by carrying out a plan – and then 
comes the vexation and the sobering up.2   
Homeland security strategy – defined as the pattern of consistent behavior over 
time – is both intentional and emergent. The homeland security community does 
a continually improving job identifying and enacting intended strategy.3 The 
community is less effective explicitly acknowledging and integrating emergent 
strategy. We can do better. 
Getting where we want to be in the next decade will be somewhat like driving 
at night. We know broadly what our destination could be. But we see only as far 
as our headlights shine and we do not know what we will encounter on the road.   
This essay describes a framework that can help keep the homeland security 
community between the white lines on the road to a future worth creating. It 
recommends a strategic process that incorporates the dynamic realities of 
complex adaptive systems. It asserts that recognizing and managing systemic 
patterns – rather than focusing on programs – would benefit homeland security.4 
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ACT ONE: PASSING ALONG THE PROLOGUE  
SCENE 1: GLAUCON IS TALKING TO SOCRATES.  
GLAUCON’S FIVE-YEAR-OLD SON HAS A BIRTHDAY NEXT MONTH, AND GLAUCON IS LOOKING 
FOR ADVICE ABOUT PLANNING THE PARTY.5 
Socrates: What is your thinking thus far? 
Glaucon:  Well, we have a birthday party strategy. The goal is for everyone to have a 
safe and enjoyable time. We have specific and measurable objectives we 
want to accomplish. We have identified the key milestones from now until 
the party. We have a timeline to follow, including a tabletop exercise. We 
are assuming a three-hour operational phase followed by a two-hour 
recovery. That evening, we will conduct a hot wash to identify any lessons 
learned to build into next year’s birthday party planning. 
Socrates:  That appears to be an efficient and sound strategy. Why do you want my 
advice? 
Glaucon:    In our past conversations, you have disagreed with everything I said.  You 
have talked me out of all my initial beliefs. I thought I would use you as 
quality control, just to make certain I did not miss anything. 
Socrates:   I really do not have anything to add. Your strategy appears to be rational 
and well conceived. I cannot imagine anything could go wrong. Shall we 
have lunch after the party so you can tell me how your strategy worked? 
 
SCENE 2: ONE MONTH AND ONE DAY LATER.   
GLAUCON MEETS SOCRATES FOR LUNCH. 
Socrates: How was the party? 
Glaucon:  If I have to do anything like that again, I will drink hemlock. 
Socrates: It did not go well? 
Glaucon:  Let me count the ways. It rained for most of the day. More children and 
parents attended than we planned for. Some of the people arrived hours 
before we were ready. They brought food, gifts, and animals and changed 
our careful arrangements into utter chaos. Some of the animals went into 
my study and scattered my projects everywhere. Organizing the children 
was like trying to get puppies to march. They did not respect or sit still for 
the devotional sacrifice. The boys constantly hit and wrestled each other. 
Many of the girls insulted and then shunned the daughter of Panagiotis, the 
wealthy merchant. The child did not stop wailing. Her mother yelled at my 
wife. They cursed my family and left. One of the children painted his face 
and hair with our clothing dye. Then all the children did. And the parents 
blamed us for not hiding the dye. No one followed the order of the games we 
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arranged. No one wanted to weave. Instead the children threw sticks and 
baskets at each other. They screeched like sea birds. The chaos went on 
forever until one child, unnoticed, left our house, walked to the end of our 
garden and fell into the sea. I have now made an eternal enemy of her 
father, the Tyrant Adamidis, and I fear for my life. 
Socrates: I see. Truly, that was a surprising outcome. Why did your strategy not 
work? What was revealed in your hot wash? Were there any lessons 
learned? 
Glaucon: I am saddened to say it was a repeat of the lessons we have learned before: 
inadequate leadership, poor communications, ineffective planning, 
inadequate resources, and poor public relations.6 Can you help me 
understand why my strategy did not work? 
Socrates: I am wise. But I am not that wise. Have you asked the women? 
Glaucon: The women? Why would I ask the women? 
Socrates: Talk with them and discover. Will you come back one year from today – if 
you are still alive, of course – and tell me what you have learned?  
 
SCENE 3: ONE YEAR LATER.   
GLAUCON ARRIVES FOR LUNCH. 
Socrates: How was your son’s birthday party? 
Glaucon:  How did you know there was a party? 
Socrates: Are you not still alive? 
Glaucon:  It was a glorious and treasured day. All the guests were ecstatic.  The 
children were filled with joy. The gods have smiled on my family. I no longer 
fear for safety or security. 
Socrates: And the cause of this surprising change in fortune?  
Glaucon: I did what you suggested. I listened to the women. 
Socrates: What did they tell you? 
Glaucon:  Many things.  But in short they said to make boundaries, create attractors, 
stabilize the patterns we desired, and disrupt the patterns that threatened 
danger and harm. 
Socrates: I do not understand. Is there a story here? 
Glaucon:  We held the party at Panathinaikon Stadium. We set up places to eat, a site 
for crafts, a tent for shelter and rest, a station for music, and a space for art. 
Singers wandered and told stories.  There was a field for wrestling and 
running and flying kites. We encouraged the children to try what they 
pleased. We helped if they asked, then we stepped back and watched. When 
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there was hitting or crying or harsh words – and there was – we 
immediately spoke sternly or separated the offenders. Then we redirected 
them toward an established activity. 
In sum, our strategy was to control only that which could be ordered. For 
those activities in the realm of that which is, and must be, unordered, we 
watched and we shaped – gently, but with insistence. Because I have 
learned to know the difference between the states of order and unorder, I am 
now seen by all Athens as the wisest of men. Second to you of course. 
Socrates:  Truly your ideas appear to be sensible and well conceived. I cannot imagine 
anything ever could go wrong with that approach. 
Glaucon:    Yes, truly, the gods be praised. I cannot wait to use this strategy at the 
Agora. 
 
ACT TWO: “THE FUTURE IS HERE.  IT’S JUST NOT WIDELY 
DISTRIBUTED YET.”7 
A central justification for speculating about homeland security futures is to 
“make strategic decisions [today] that will be sound for all plausible futures.”8  
Based on the nation’s experiences over the past five years, it appears the rapidly 
formed homeland security community remains too disordered to make coherent 
strategic decisions that have much intentional impact on even the short-term 
future.9  Instead, we have lots of people and organizations making and reacting to 
multiple homeland security decisions, generating a bubbling swamp of intended 
and unintended consequences.10   
Most of the significant issues in the homeland security policy space are too 
undefined, too broad, too complex – in a phrase, too wicked – to allow an 
ordered and intentional journey into the future.11  If this assessment is correct, 
how can strategic planning for the future of homeland security be anything other 
than what George Bernard Shaw said about chess:  a foolish expedient for making 
idle people believe they are doing something very clever? 
 
A Strategic Sense-making Framework for Homeland Security 
Futures12 
Strategic homeland security issues can be located in five kinds of 
phenomenological space (Figure 1). 13  “Known” and “knowable” issues are in the 
realm of the ordered (highlighted in Figure 1 in yellow), a world populated by 
scientific knowledge, research, technology, and standards-based human 
interactions.  It is a world where efficiency is king.14  “Complex” and “chaotic” 
issues (highlighted in red) are in the province of the “unordered.”15 It is the 
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sphere of social systems, self-organization, emergence, and retrospective sense-









Homeland security policy dynamics – now and in the future – are significantly 
influenced by how stakeholders perceive a specific issue.  In the framework used 
here – known as the Cynefin framework – there are five ways to perceive an 
issue: 
(1) The known: a space where cause and effect are understood and 
predictable, hence “everyone”17 knows what to do about the issue.  One 
example is a special event venue-design strategy that incorporates 
empirically based standoff distances for potential explosives.18 A second 
example is a decision that public safety personnel will use plain-language 
communications during an incident, rather than 10-Codes or other 
specialized idiom.19 
(2) The knowable: a space where cause and effect relationships may be 
difficult to derive or understand, but researchers and experts – given 
sufficient time and resources – can determine.  An example is identifying 
and protecting critical nodes in a region’s electrical power or water 
distribution network.20 
Figure 1: Sense-Making Domains in Homeland Security 
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(3) The complex: a space where one knows cause and effect only 
retrospectively.  What appears logical after the fact – i.e., when the dots 
have been connected – is but one of many other logical outcomes that 
could have occurred.  There is no guarantee the cause-effect relationships 
will persist or repeat. This is the domain of complexity theory and complex 
adaptive systems.  The pre-9/11 intelligence is one of many examples that 
fit this phenomenological space.21 
(4) The chaotic: a space so turbulent that cause and effect are unknown; 
strategically, it is not clear what to do with any measure of certainty.  The 
example here is the first hours and days after Katrina hit the Gulf Coast.  
(5) The disordered: When there is insufficient stakeholder agreement about 
how to make sense out of a particular homeland security issue – the 
central space in Figure 1 – the issue can be said to be disordered.  Cynthia 
Kurtz and David Snowden, who developed the Cynefin sense-making 
framework, assert the central space is key to understanding the conflicts 
among stakeholders about how to perceive and act on an issue: 
…Individuals compete to interpret the central space [disorder] on the 
basis of their preference for action.  Those most comfortable with stable 
order [the known] seek to create or enforce rules; experts seek to conduct 
research and accumulate data [in the knowable domain]; politicians seek 
to increase the number and range of their [network] contacts; and, finally, 
the dictators, eager to take advantage of a chaotic situation, seek absolute 
control.22  
On the surface, this framework is a potentially useful way to group homeland 
security issues.  However, does the model contribute anything to understanding 
how to create a desirable homeland security future? 
 
The Known in Homeland Security  
There is very little of strategic utility in homeland security known with the 
precision of a scientific theory.23 We can forecast with near certainty some 
aspects of the future, but their impact on homeland security is unknown.  Here is 
a personal list.  We will have one, maybe two new presidents in the next ten 
years.  We will have five congresses.  Terrorists will probably attack us again.  
There will likely be suicide bombers and car bombs in this country.  Our 
transportation system and chemical plants will probably be hit.   
If we are not attacked again within the next decade, it will be difficult to 
maintain the nation’s homeland security apparatus.  The national government’s 
budget, let alone most states’ and cities’ budgets, will not sustain it.  Homeland 
security as a national program will atrophy. 
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Anyone familiar with homeland security can build a list of probable futures.  
Nevertheless, the question remains: what strategic decisions should be made now 
to prepare for the disruptions the known future will bring (a new president, a new 






The Knowable In Homeland Security24 
Some dimensions of homeland security’s strategic future are complicated, but 
knowable. Experts can construct functional outputs that will support strategic 
intentions. These tend to be the realms where technology plays more of a role than 
people: data and voice transmission systems, radiation and bio detectors, reducing 
vulnerabilities in networked infrastructure, using video surveillance data and so 
on. This space also includes standards-based behaviors, like the emergency 
management resource typing envisioned by the National Incident Management 
System and the 2006 Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act.25   
In principle, the strategic decisions required to address issues in this domain are 
knowable because the space can be organized around the predictive utility of cause 
and effect relationships. It will take time and money to figure out what to do and 
sufficient power to mandate behaviors. However, there are strategic issues that can 
be ordered, constructed, and brought into the future.  Figure 2 lists a few of the 
homeland security issues arguably situated in this domain.26 
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Figure 2: Some Knowable Homeland Security Issues 
• Securing systems against 
cyber terrorism 




• Fusing intelligence 
information 
• Assessing vulnerabilities 
• Expanding hospital surge 
capacity 
• Protecting chemical 
infrastructure 
• Using the internet as a 
weapons delivery system 
• Developing vaccines against 
pandemic disease 
• Mass distribution of antibiotics 
and vaccines 
 
• Protecting food supplies 
• Quantum cryptology in 
information security 
• Educating citizens about 
preparedness 
• Increasing private sector 
involvement in homeland 
security 
• Expanding terrorism risk 
insurance 
• Achieving energy 
independence 
• Creating collaborative 
networks 
• Improving public 
transportation security 
• Applying neurocognitive 
research to security systems 
 
The Complex in Homeland Security  
A hypothesis suggested by the Cynefin framework is that the most significant 
strategic issues the homeland security community will face in the next ten years 
are in the unordered domain of complex adaptive systems. Issues within this 
space will continually evolve in unpredictably interactive and uncontrollable 
ways. It is not obvious what decisions one can make today to affect outcomes in 
the complexity space. The assumption here is one can make only an educated 
guess about what the future will bring, and how it will bring it. Science and 
research offer little prospective assistance. Why issues unfolded as they did can 
only be known after the fact. Any apparent order in this space emerges through 
“retrospective coherence.”27   
The issues in this domain are “open problems.”  They are open because they 
will never go away or be resolved fully. They are problems in both a functional 
sense (they are a source of grief and opportunity) and in a philosophical sense 
(they are issues from which the future of homeland security will emerge). The 
planning methodologies and strategic tools that work well in the ordered domain 
of known and knowable issues are ineffective in the domain of the unordered.28  
New modes of inquiry and action are needed if policymakers are to do more than 
watch the future of homeland security happen.  
Figure 3 identifies some complex issues whose unfolding will influence the 
strategic future of homeland security. 
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Figure 3: Twenty Five Complex Homeland Security Issues
• International terrorists – Keeping 
international terrorists out of the 
country. 
• Radicalization – Preventing the 
development of homegrown terrorists. 
• Pandemics – Social impacts of 
pandemics. 
• Al Qaeda – Al Qaeda’s evolving 
strategic logic. 
• Iraq and Afghanistan – The impact of 
the terrorism wars on homeland 
security. 
• Non-State Threats – The evolution of 
non-state threats. 
• Next Generation Terrorists – 
Preventing the next generation of 
domestic and international terrorists. 
• Agendas – Determining which issues 
get on the homeland security policy 
agenda, and what happens to issues 
once they get on an agenda. 
• Leadership – Appropriate models of 
effective leadership for the variety of 
environments in homeland security. 
• Governance – Organizing homeland 
security at all levels to prevent and 
respond to terrorism.  
• Prevention – The elements of an 
effective prevention strategy. 
• Technology – What homeland security-
related technologies work, what do not, 
and under what situations. What 
problems technology solves. What 
problems technology creates, especially 
when it fails29 
• Resources – What resources are 
needed to prevent terrorism, and where 
they are going to come from. What 
resources states and cities will 
contribute to keep their jurisdictions 
secure. 
• Allocation – The basis for allocating 
homeland security resources. 
• Culture – How the multiplicity of public, 
private, local, state, and national 
government cultures affect the success 
of homeland security projects. 
• Resilience – How citizens and 
communities can become resilient to 
catastrophic events. 
• Social Capital – How social capital is 
built, maintained, and used in a 
complex, multi-agency homeland 
security environment. 
• Authorities – Whether agencies have 
the authority they need to accomplish 
security missions. What impact current 
and future authorities have on the 
Constitution, on civil liberties, and on 
the kind of nation we will be. 
• Communication – How we share 
usable information more effectively, 
from both a technological and a 
sociological perspective. 
• Language – The vocabulary of 
homeland security, and how we develop 
shared meanings across all sectors. 
• Contractors –The roles contractors 
play in shaping the future of homeland 
security.   
• Knowledge transfer – How we know 
when we have learned something 
significant about homeland security. 
How that knowledge is transferred to 
and adopted by others. 
• Standards – How effective 
preparedness standards will be 
developed, adopted, maintained, and 
used. 
• Networks – How self-organizing 
homeland security systems will be 
directed toward specific goals.   
• Imagination – How the homeland 
security community can foster and 
maintain a creative imagination.
 
Chaos In Homeland Security 
The chaotic state has no discernable order. There are no patterns. When lives are 
at stake, there is no time to wait for systems to organize themselves. The chaotic 
state is turbulent and requires stabilization or using the chaos as an opportunity 
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for innovation. Stability may have to be imposed – through knowledge, by 
authoritarian response, or by charismatic leadership.30 
How will the American people and their government respond to the first 
domestic dirty bomb, suicide bomber, biological attack, or pandemic? One can 
speculate, but until an incident happens, no one can know the answer with 
anything approaching certainty. The answer will emerge from the domain of 
chaos.   
New Orleans after Katrina is an example of the chaotic homeland security 
space involving life safety issues. Initially, there were lots of victims, responders, 
policies, procedures, and systems interacting in uncontrolled and unpredictable 
ways. Eventually, Russell Honoré morphed from a Lieutenant General into a 
John Wayne dude and – according to the public narrative – saved the day.31 It is 
not clear he had the authority to do everything he did.32  He or some of his troops 
may have violated Posse Comitatus rules.33 At the time – and even now – few 
people cared.  The drama was real. The situation required a fix.  Honoré’s actions 
helped to initiate the appearance of stability. That gave Admiral Thad Allen and 
many others the opportunity to begin coordinating the federal government’s 
more patterned response to the complex adaptive system that is now New 
Orleans.  
  
MEETING THE FUTURE 
Mensh tracht; Gott lacht (Man plans; God laughs.)  
– Yiddish proverb 
–  
“In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is 
indispensable.”  
  – Dwight Eisenhower (attributed) 
 
These two sayings illustrate strategic folk wisdom about unorder. There are 
realms of existence that cannot be controlled – a child’s birthday party, for 
example, or a national strategy for homeland security. From a strategic 
perspective, homeland security is a complex adaptive social system created, 
maintained, and altered by more dependent variables than can be incorporated 
into any formula, heuristic, or plan.   
The core assertion in this point of view is that since control is not a property of 
a complex social system, we cannot make strategic decisions today that will be 
sound for all plausible futures. Shaw, with modifications, may be correct: 
Strategic planning in homeland security for issues in the unordered domain is a 
foolish expedient for making dedicated and busy people believe they are doing 
something important. 
The core assertion about control is readily tested.   
1. Make a decision: Define what you want to happen in one 
homeland security issue space that has a significant human 
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component: voice interoperability within a public safety region that 
crosses political boundaries; risk assessment and risk 
management; information and intelligence sharing; collaboration 
among public safety disciplines; organizing across cities, states 
and regions; leading within a homeland security regional 
network; creating a culture of preparedness; developing and 
using metrics for the target capabilities list; determining how to 
allocate homeland security grants; protecting land, sea, and air 
borders; ensuring security of public transportation systems; 
protecting critical infrastructure; developing resilient 
communities; identifying terrorist threats, protecting privacy, 
preserving the core values of the U.S. Constitution, 
understanding judicial decisions that affect homeland security, 
expanding public health and medical capabilities, figuring out 
the role of the military in homeland security, managing complex 
incidents during an emergency, and so on.  
2. Assess the future: Describe what could happen in the issue space 
you select within the next six months, one year, three years, five 
years, and then ten years.34   
3. Expand the future: Describe the interactive effects of the other 
issues on your selected homeland security issue. How, for 
example, will changes in military technology and judicial 
decisions affect the capacity of law enforcement and other public 
safety professions to share information, protect infrastructure, 
and so on?   
4. Incorporate the environment: When that analysis is done, 
overlay environmental factors not directly related to the 
substance of those issues, first to each of the issues and then to 
the cascade of interactive effects: politics, demographics, 
economics, wars, changes in players, cultures, disasters, health 
issues, information flow, decisions, resources, laws, and/or 
unexpected events. 
5. Reassess your decision: Check in every year or so to see how 
your forecasts are doing. 
 
This is a difficult analytical task, probably impossible. We can envision, 
strategize, and plan with all the capacity, talent, and methodologies dedicated 
homeland security agencies and contractors can muster. However we will not 
know the future of homeland security until we get there. Once we arrive, we can 
connect dots, attribute cause and effect, identify lessons learned, and get 
conceptually fat on the other explanatory rituals we engage in. Traditional science 
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and certainty will not lead us to a homeland security future worth creating. 
Adaptability may. 
Still, the rational hope that springs eternal insists that we must not avoid 
making our best decisions today. Our normative ideal is to make decisions within 
a strategic framework. The sense-making structure presented here suggests the 
best we probably can do about the future – at least in the province of unorder  – 
is to make decisions based mostly on what we see today, and loosely on what we 
want to be doing tomorrow. Our stance needs to shift from the desire to design 
and control human systems (a strategy that works in the realm of the known and 
the knowable) to the ability to recognize and influence patterns in those 
systems.35 We need to learn how to become a partner with an uncontrollable 
future. 
Consider how one rears children. They are not little machines waiting to be 
directed by higher headquarters. They are people learning how to be free and 
responsible citizens. Their future emerges; it is not designed. So too with 
homeland security – it is only five years old.  
Intermission: A Number of Presidents on the head of a pin 
Herbert Hoover: Let me understand what you are trying to say here. The 
American people – aided by knowledge, technology, and enough power to 
shame the wildest desires of ancient gods – should just throw up their hands 
and quit? Controlling our environment, creating the future we want is just too 
hard to do, so let us sit around and wait to see what happens? 
Abraham Lincoln: That is not what I am hearing. I think the argument is 
keep trying to master what we can. There is much in the world we can know, 
can predict, and can shape to our intention. But when many people, 
organizations, and interests are involved, our directive power is practically for 
naught. Yes, we have the power to control almost anything if we had the will to 
do that. We have laws, courts, armies, police, and prisons to enforce our will. 
But that is not our Republic. I knew a rich man back home who loved the sound 
of one particular nightingale. He had it captured and brought to him and placed 
in an elegant cage. Of course that bird stopped singing and eating and it 
practically died before the man released it. The bird started singing again, but it 
never got back the song it used to have. I do not want our Republic to lose its 
song. 
Herbert Hoover: An interesting theory, perhaps. Secretary Mellon advocated 
this “leave it alone” approach in 1929. I rejected it then as I reject it now. My 
intent was to encourage voluntary measures by the private sector, state, and 
local government to restart the engine of business and industry. My strategy 
was to rely on the independence and self-reliance of the American people. I 
wanted to allow economic restoration and growth to emerge through the 
market. You saw what happened. My reluctance to lead more forcefully harmed 
our country – almost irreparably. 
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Franklin Roosevelt: As I hear the argument, that is the point. You do try to 
control what you can and must. The idea is to understand when you can control 
and when you cannot. The argument is not, “Try harder and you can control 
more.” It is learn to distinguish between the known, knowable, and the complex. 
It means use different strategies, different tools for different situations. I could 
not control the nation’s economy either. But like any American president, I 
could strongly influence the national direction. My strategy was similar to 
Glaucon’s. I set boundaries around where I was going to act. I established 
programs in the first 100 days – many of them my predecessor’s ideas – 
without a clear idea of what they would do. I was probing to see what would 
happen. I was acting, not analyzing.  My strategy was to shoot first, and then to 
aim. When the programs seemed to work, I stabilized them. When they did not – 
or when the courts said I could go no further – I stopped. My job as the strategic 
leader of the nation was to shape the future. Hitler and Stalin tried to control 
the future of their nations.  Their legacy is fear and death. Our legacy is 
freedom. 
 
ACT THREE: BE HERE NOW36 
It helps to know where you are before deciding where you want to go. So where 
are we? As we enter the middle of our first homeland security decade, what is our 
strategy? And where did it come from? 
If you believe our homeland security strategy can be described by citing the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security, then – with respect – you have not 
been paying close attention. In my view, no one knows with certainty what our 
homeland security strategy actually is. There are many opinions about it.  Experts 
may eventually come to a consensus about what some – or maybe all – of it is. 
But if there is a current consensus, it has not been “widely distributed” within the 
homeland security community. 
There is no single place one can go to discover even the “espoused” HLS 
strategy, let along the strategy “in use.”37 As the Government Accountability 
Office and others have pointed out,38 the homeland security strategy is a 
patchwork of multiple strategies, laws, presidential directives, grant guidance, 
and related documents. It includes the strategies and practices of state, local, and 
regional entities. It incorporates whatever the private sector is – or is not – doing.   
But even if we just restricted our knowledge to the official National Strategy 
for Homeland Security, we still come up with as many questions as answers.  
The first objective of the (Grand) National Strategy is to prevent terrorist 
attacks. What strategic guidance informs programs designed to achieve that 
objective? We have an “always activated” national response plan.39  We have a 
national system for managing incidents. We have – or will have soon – a national 
catastrophic response plan. We have lots of response strategies. We have yet to 
develop a national strategy for preventing terrorism.40   
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Obviously we are doing many things to prevent terrorism. My point is about 
the relationship between what we are doing and what our strategy says we should 
be doing. Someone could make the case that there is a relationship, and explain 
how it led us to where we are today with prevention. Any such description would 
be constructed by looking at what we are doing today – with fusion centers, 
better coordination among disciplines and regions, data mining, wiretapping, 
analyst training, and so on – and creating a plausible explanation about how we 
got here. In other words, we can know our prevention strategy – as we can know 




DHS Executive: Your argument is simply not correct. We have numerous 
strategies. They may not be perfect, but they are thought out and for the most 
part integrated. Each one of them can be articulated. They identify ends, ways, 
and means.  They inform our policies, our programs, and our budget decisions.   
Senate Homeland Security Leader: I have to agree with DHS here. The 
nation’s homeland security strategy is comprehensive and robust. While many 
problems remain unresolved, anyone knowledgeable in this area knows that we 
have made significant progress. 
House Homeland Security Leader: I agree with the Senator and DHS. As a 
nation we have strong strategic direction, supported by many – not yet all – of 
the policies we need to carry out the strategy. We agree there remains a lot of 
work to do.  But there is no question. We are better off now than we were five 
years ago. 
Author (mumbling): I wonder what the result would be if each of you and your 
staffs wrote down what you think our homeland security strategy is. How close, 
how detailed would each of the responses be? What would be included in the 
responses? What would be left out? And then how would that compare with the 
National Strategy – and others – as written, or with a consensus strategy derived 
from all of us talking about what has been created over the past five years? 
Since homeland security is not just what happens in the District of Columbia, 
let’s take the experiment on the road and visit the states and territories and tribes 
and UASI cities and professional associations and Northern Command. Let’s talk 
to citizens who care about homeland security. What would we end up with then? 
No doubt with enough time and talk we could look at the empirical evidence 
and come to some agreement about what the nation’s strategy is. And that is my 
point. The coherence of the strategy comes after it has happened, not before.  
Homeland security is a complex human and technical system. No matter what we 
decide prospectively our strategy should be, we will only know, we can only 
know, after it happens.   
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And when we pause at that moment to congratulate ourselves for the 
perceptiveness of our retrospective coherence, homeland security will change 
some more. 
 
ACT FOUR: TAXICAB PRESCRIPTIONS 
Strategy is a pattern of consistent behavior over time. It is a mix of intended and 
realized behavior. It combines visions of the future with emergent adaptations.  
These are well known ideas that are compatible with the sense-making frame 
described in this paper. 42 
Homeland security strategy in the known and knowable domain – mostly 
involving technology and standards – should be guided by norms of rationality, 
scientific knowledge and research, efficiency, and true “best practices.” 
The other side of the homeland security strategic jungle – the side composed 
of complex social systems – is characterized by an ontological state of unorder.  
Cause and effect are known only after the fact, and through consensus.  
Replicability is illusory at any but the most global level of generalization. Best 
practice is replaced by smart practice, emergent practice, or novel practice.43 
The leadership task is to sift through the elements of strategic disorder (the 
center space in Figure 1) and determine whether an issue can be ordered – and 
thus subject to a rich set of knowledge and methodologies – or whether the 
issue’s organic state is unorder, and we are wasting time and resources trying – 
as Glaucon first did – to control the party. 
Specific homeland security programs are a necessary, but insufficient, way to 
get us into a future worth creating. Homeland security strategy in the unordered 
domain requires a different approach – one compatible with the skills of a poet, 
storyteller, or old-school weather observer.   
As noted throughout this essay, the central prescription for strategic action 
within complexity is to work at the level of patterns.44 Acknowledge that 
retrospective coherence is an organic property of complexity, not an anomaly or 
flaw to be corrected. To influence what happens, establish boundaries.  Use 
attractors to seed beneficial patterns. When a desired pattern forms, stabilize it.  
When undesirable patterns start to form, disrupt them. 
One can cite the development of fusion centers as an example of an emergent, 
pattern-based approach to homeland security strategy.45   
Fusion centers started at the state level, in response to a post-9/11 recognition 
that information needed to be shared more effectively. Fusion centers were not 
mandated by the national government. Initially the centers – serving as 
“attractors” – primarily involved law enforcement agencies. Those boundaries 
expanded as state leaders in Georgia, Arizona, Illinois, and elsewhere recognized 
the need to share information with other disciplines. Based on the experiences of 
the centers, the National Governors Association, Homeland Security Advisory 
Council, the Department of Homeland Security, and others provide stakeholders 
with “stabilizing” guidance in how to establish fusions centers. The innovation 
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continues to spread with states, cities, and regions adapting the concept in 
ways that make sense in their jurisdictions.   
In a recent systemic development, some analysts recognize that “fusion” 
means more than simply putting people from different agencies in the same 
room.  Information also has to be fused.46 This insight represents the early stages 
of another pattern in the continuing evolution of fusion centers.   
There are some efforts being made to mandate standards for centers. That 
potential pattern will dissipate if imposed standards do not add value to 
intelligence activities. 
 
In the District of Columbia, late one rainy January night, a man got into a taxi 
heading back to his hotel. His day had been spent going from building to 
building, attending one homeland security meeting after another  The cold, 
confusion, and complexity of the day, mixed with too much coffee and not 
enough food or sleep, colored his mood. 
“This is some city,” he said to the driver. “I think they should break this place 
up and move pieces of the government all over the country. It shouldn’t be 
centralized like this. It’s too crazy.” 
“No, you don’t want to do that,” the driver said, keeping his attention on the 
road. “You really want them all here, in one place, so you can keep an eye on 
them.” 
 
The complex adaptive-system framework suggests an alternative to either the 
decentralizing or centralizing options offered by the passenger and driver: use 
complexity; take advantage of its properties as a way to strengthen the process 
and substance of homeland security strategy. 
Homeland security will travel toward the future in the company of rationalists 
who see order and intentionality, and realists who see the coherence of strategy 
retrospectively. Homeland security – as a distinct policy domain – can formalize 
the interaction and learning between the two worldviews. It can support regular 
inquiry – a forum or idea market47 – in the dance between homeland security 
strategy espoused and homeland security strategy in use.  
The purpose of formal and recurring strategic inquiry would be to monitor and 
identify trends in strategic intentions, discontinuities, and coherence. The 
findings from the periodic inquiry would be distributed into the complex adaptive 
mix of information that swirls within homeland security.   
What happens after that can only be known retrospectively. 
 
CODA: DOGMAS OF THE PAST 
Abraham Lincoln’s message to congress on December 1, 1862 included words 
cited before and after the September 11, 2001 attacks.48  They are words worth 
recalling: 
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We can succeed only by concert.  It is not "can any of us imagine better,” 
but "can we all do better?"  The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate 
to the stormy present.  The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we 
must rise – with the occasion.  As our case is new, so we must think anew, 
and act anew.  
Recognizing the strategic difference between order, disorder, and unorder – and 
responding accordingly – can be at the heart of thinking and acting anew.  
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